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Abstract 
Object substitution masking (OSM) occurs when a sparse (e.g., four dot), temporally-trailing 
mask obscures the visibility of a briefly-presented target. Here, we review theories of OSM: 
Those which propose that OSM reflects the interplay between feedforward and 
feedback/reentrant neural processes, those which predict that feedforward processing alone 
gives rise to the phenomenon and theories that focus on cognitive explanations, such as 
object updating. We discuss how each of these theories accommodates key findings from the 
OSM literature. In addition, we examine the relationship between OSM and other visual-
cognitive phenomena, including object correspondence through occlusion, change blindness, 
metacontrast masking, backward masking, and visual short-term memory. Finally, we will 
examine the level of processing at which OSM impairs target perception. Collectively, OSM 
appears to reflect the conditions under which the brain confuses two visual events for one 
when they are encoded with low spatiotemporal resolution, due to processing resources being 
otherwise occupied.  
Keywords: object substitution masking; attention; re-entrant processing; consciousness;  
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When observing a visual scene, at any point in time, we are only conscious of a small fraction 
of the available information. Given this limitation, it is important to understand the 
mechanisms that determine what and when we become conscious of stimuli, and the nature of 
processing that occurs in the absence of explicit awareness. There exists a long and rich 
history in experimental psychology of using visual masking to explore such issues. Visual 
masking refers to conditions where the visibility of one to be reported visual stimulus (the 
target) is obscured by the presentation of another stimulus (the mask) that appears in close 
spatiotemporal proximity and does not require report. Object substitution masking (OSM) is a 
recent discovery in the field of visual masking, and is an ideal tool for exploring questions 
about visual awareness because it selectively impairs the extent to which an individual 
becomes conscious of a visual stimulus without the extent of image-level degradation that 
other forms of visual masking induce. This review, therefore, focusses on the determinants 
and consequences of visual awareness in OSM.  
Here we integrate a diverse range of literature to discern what OSM can tell us about 
perceptual consciousness and visual cognition in general. Specifically, we discuss the role of 
feedforward versus feedback processing in giving rise to OSM, whether the phenomenon is 
better characterised as reflecting object updating or object substitution, the similarities and 
differences between OSM, and other forms of masking and OSM’s relationship to other 
visual-cognitive phenomena. In addition, we review evidence regarding the role of attention 
in masking. Our aim is to address controversies in the OSM literature in depth, offer insights 
into how some of them may already be resolved, and how the field might go about resolving 
those that remain. We begin by describing the emergence of OSM from the visual masking 
literature.  
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Visual masking  
 It was first documented in the late nineteenth century that the presentation of a 
stimulus (the mask) has the potential to interfere with the perception of a prior target stimulus 
when they shared a common spatial location, and that this impairment provides a metric of 
the time taken to recognise the target item (Baxt, 1871; translated in Baxt, 1982). This finding 
has inspired considerable research interest, chiefly as a tool for exploring the mechanisms 
that determine which stimuli enter perceptual consciousness and give rise to our rich visual 
experience. In the early twentieth century, it was discovered that masking impairments 
extended to conditions where the target and mask occupied distinct (but usually contiguous) 
spatial locations if they had similar contours – which came to be known as metacontrast 
masking (Alpern, 1952, 1953; Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006; Werner, 1935). Strikingly, 
metacontrast masking produces a U-shaped masking function, with strongest masking 
typically occurring when the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the target and mask 
is between 50-100ms, with weaker or absent masking at shorter and longer SOAs 
(Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006). This counterintuitive departure from monotonicity has been 
the impetus for many investigations into masking and has been the topic of considerable 
theorising (Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976; Bridgeman, 1971, 1977; Francis, 1997; Kahneman, 
1967; Weisstein, 1968).  
Over a decade ago, Di Lollo, Enns and Rensink (2000) discovered a form of masking 
that displayed properties that did not fit with conventional accounts: A mask that consisted of 
only four dots could impair the visibility of a target with which it shared little physical 
similarity and never spatially overlapped. This masking was characterised by the target and 
mask having a common-onset, and the key variable was duration of the mask stimulus 
trailing target offset (mask duration), rather than the SOA between the target and mask (Di 
Lollo, et al., 2000; Enns & Di Lollo, 2000). This impairment of target visibility was termed 
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OSM (Enns & Di Lollo, 1997), and it reflected an exciting new development emerging from 
a rich tradition of visual masking research in experimental psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience. OSM is clearly distinct from backward masking by pattern, structure, or noise, 
where the mask spatially overlaps the target after a given SOA (Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006), 
since the four dots never even partly cover the target. OSM is more similar to metacontrast 
masking and, initially, there was debate about whether it was an original form of masking or 
merely a variant of metacontrast (Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2000). The evidence since then, 
however, has demonstrated that while there are some similarities, metacontrast and OSM are 
experimentally dissociable. For example, Chakravarthi and Cavanagh (2009) demonstrated 
that ‘crowding’, the deficit in identifying a target in the periphery owing to overly-close 
adjacent flankers (Pelli & Tillman, 2008), could be prevented when metacontrast masks were 
applied to the flankers but was not when four-dot masks were applied. This suggests that 
metacontrast masking has an earlier locus of suppression than crowding, whereas OSM has a 
later locus of suppression (Chakravarthi & Cavanagh, 2009). These similarities and 
differences between OSM and metacontrast masking and the functional properties of the 
visual system which they tap will be discussed in greater detail subsequently in this review. 
Presently, however, we will focus on a description of the properties that define OSM. 
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attention to the mask exacerbates OSM (Tata & Giaschi, 2004). However, like the 
distribution of attention during target exposure, it is not necessary in order to produce 
masking (Neill, et al., 2002). 
Recently, however, it has been argued that the limited masking obtained with the 
presentation of a target stimulus without distractors is the result of a ceiling effect 
constraining performance in this condition, and the purported hallmark interaction between 
the number of distractors and mask duration (Di Lollo et al., 2000) is an artefact of this 
constraint (Argyropoulos, Gellatly, Pilling, & Carter, in press). These authors demonstrated 
that when performance is shifted away from ceiling, although both set-size (number of 
stimuli in the target array, target and distractors) and mask duration impaired target 
perception, their effects were additive rather than interactive. Argyropoulos et al. also 
obtained significant masking when the target was the only item in the target array (no 
distractors; set-size one). However, even in this condition, the target could appear in any one 
of four possible locations, meaning that there was still an element of uncertainty about the 
spatial location of the target, and consequently attentional resources would have to be 
distributed across the potential target locations. Therefore, while it appears that OSM is not 
necessarily defined by an interaction between set-size and mask duration, there is still no 
conclusive evidence against the idea that OSM depends on the prevention of focussed 
attention on the target.  
Collectively, the results above demonstrate that there are several key physical 
characteristics that define OSM: 1) Attention is distributed during target exposure; 2) target 
exposure is relatively brief (<= 100ms); 3) the mask continues to remain physically present 
after target offset (or at the very least is visible after target offset; (Enns & Di Lollo, 1997; 
Lleras & Moore, 2003)); and 4) it is characterised by a loss of visual awareness of the target. 
In this next section, we specify what we mean by ‘awareness’, describe some of the 
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prominent theories put forward to explain OSM, and then analyse their ability to account for 
the key findings in the literature.  
Awareness 
For the present purposes, when we discuss visual awareness or consciousness (used 
interchangeably in this review) in relation to masking, we specifically refer the ability to 
report either the stimulus’ presence, or identity (depending on the task). This reportability 
definition of visual awareness is what Block (1995, 2011) has referred to as access 
awareness. Block argues that this is an incomplete definition of consciousness because there 
is also the possibility for phenomenal consciousness – the subjective sense of being aware of 
something without being able to explicitly report it. Note that this is different from the failure 
of visual awareness that we can measure in masking – being able to report stimulus presence 
(detection) without being able to accurately report identity. Instead, phenomenal 
consciousness is the purported situation of being aware without even being able to report that 
one is aware of something at any level. So when we present the findings from visual masking 
studies that use reportability as a gauge of visual awareness, and infer that failures of 
reportability mean failures of conscious processing, there remains the possibility that 
participants could have this phenomenal consciousness state of the visual stimulus.  
The notion of a present but unreportable awareness is, however, not testable. We can 
neither rely on reportability, nor establish an implicit measure. For example, in order to 
develop a physiological signature of phenomenal consciousness, it would first be necessary to 
establish its presence versus absence and then correlate this with an accompanying 
physiological response. But this would require measuring phenomenal consciousness to begin 
with, but since explicit report does not suffice as a measure, this approach gets us no further 
ahead. In fact, it is not clear that there is any appropriate reference against which to gauge 
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phenomenal consciousness (Kouider, de Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010; Kouider, 
Sackur, & de Gardelle, 2012). For these reasons, we will focus exclusively on access 
awareness.  
 The majority of OSM studies use identification as a measure of target awareness. For 
example, in Enns and Di Lollo’s (1997) task, participants’ were required to perform a two-
alternative forced choice discrimination, where the target was a diamond with either its left or 
right corner cropped off. In this case, if participants could not accurately report the identity of 
the target, it was inferred that their visual awareness of it was impaired. A few studies, 
however, have also used a target detection task (e.g., Chen & Treisman, 2009) where 
participants make a judgement regarding whether a target is present or absent. In this task 
participants can err in one of two ways; a ‘false alarm’, in which the target was absent but 
they indicated they thought it was present, and a ‘miss’, where the target was present, but the 
participant responded that it was absent. Misses represent the most severe failures of 
awareness. If a participant makes an error on a target identification or discrimination task, 
then it is reasonable to assume that the participant’s awareness of the stimulus item was 
impaired, but it is still possible (even likely) that they had a sense that something was 
fleetingly present. That is, both target discrimination and detection are valid measures of 
awareness of a masked target – it is just that errors on these tasks they may simply represent 
different levels or severities of failures of consciousness.  
 Of course, it is possible to correctly guess the target’s identity or presence, even in the 
absence of an explicit awareness of the target and consequently ‘target correct’ responses 
across an experiment reflect a mix of actual target aware trials and some guesses. The errors 
on such forced-choice metrics, however, have a more clear-cut interpretation: Impaired visual 
awareness. If one is aware of the target, then they do not need to guess – they can simply 
respond accurately. Thus, any ‘unaware’ condition as isolated via forced choice target 
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identification or detection measures can be more confidently thought to have isolated 
conditions of unawareness.  
 One potential issue, however, with detection tasks is the issue of response criteria. 
That is, some participants might have a liberal threshold for what they deem sufficient 
sensory evidence to conclude that a target was present, whereas others might have a more 
conservative approach and only deem a target ‘present’ in light of much stronger sensory 
evidence. This issue can be mitigated by use of measures of sensitivity (such as d’) which 
take into account response bias and allow it to be disentangled from sensitivity. But such 
measures only apply to aggregate measures in a condition and do not resolve the problem if 
trials are sorted based on responses in order to examine the fate of a masked target. An 
approach to dealing with this issue is to explicitly encourage one type of criterion (e.g., if you 
have any sense that a stimulus was there, report that it was). But still, for these reasons, some 
authors prefer a discrimination metric in which participants are forced to make a response 
about the target which removes any deliberation about when to respond.  
 Another potential criticism of the reportability definition of awareness, however, is 
that participants may have been fleetingly aware of a visual stimulus, but due to forgetting are 
subsequent unable to report it. This seems unlikely in visual masking paradigms, especially 
when the task requires report of the stimulus identity/presence within a fraction of a second 
of the stimulus itself. However, it remains a possibility, but it is also one that is impossible to 
empirically gauge, and thus, like phenomenal consciousness, this possibility appears outside 
the scope of investigation.  In this next section, we will describe the theories put forward to 
explain the failure of visual awareness in OSM.  
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Theories of OSM  
 Feedback versus feedforward-only models and OSM 
 It was once thought that visual perception conformed exclusively to a feedforward 
hierarchy of processing in which areas encoded increasingly complex stimulus properties 
(Hubel, 1963). However, it is now widely recognised that in addition to this, the brain has 
extensive re-entrant connections between regions, implying that perception does not 
exclusively conform to a hierarchy of analysis (Bullier, 2001; Zeki, 1993). Instead, it has 
been suggested that conscious perception is achieved via re-entrant processing (Cudeiro & 
Sillito, 2006; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001; Zeki, 2001). In this 
section we will discuss the re-entrant processing account that was first offered to explain 
OSM (Di Lollo et al., 2000), as well as other models of re-entrant processing and their 
applicability to the phenomenon. Finally, we examine the ability of exclusively feedforward 
models to account for OSM.  
Mumford (1991) proposed one of the earliest re-entrant models of object perception. 
A unique aspect of this account was that it posited that the thalamus is the destination for 
feedback processing and the locus for integrating input from different cortical areas, thus 
representing the current cohesive contents of consciousness. In this framework the term 
‘active blackboard’ is used to describe how the thalamus maintains the current best 
reconstruction of the visual world. Specifically, perceptual processing is hypothesised to 
begin with a feedforward sweep through early areas that registers stimulus feature 
information, which then continues on to higher cortical regions (e.g., inferior temporal [IT] 
cortex) where it activates multiple abstract representations (hypotheses) regarding object 
identity. From there, recurrent processing proceeds down a pathway from the cortex to the 
thalamus where representations are compared in parallel against sensory information still 
reverberating from the feedforward sweep. The model employs a “relaxation algorithm” 
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which chooses the hypothesis that is the closest match for the sensory information. Conscious 
perception of this representation then ensues (Di Lollo, 2012; Mumford, 1991).  
Mumford’s (1991) model was developed as a general theory of object perception and 
predates the discovery of OSM. As a model of object perception, it has its merits, and it is 
noteworthy for being ahead of its time in terms of its emphasis on re-entrant processing. 
Moreover, there is supporting physiological evidence, for example, activity in the 
(subcortical) lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) strongly correlates with the contents of visual 
awareness (Wunderlich, Schneider, & Kastner, 2005). But, fMRI has revealed that OSM 
activates frontal regions and primary visual cortex, and the magnitude of the BOLD response 
changes in these areas correlated with effectiveness of OSM (Weidner, Shah, & Fink, 2006). 
Moreover, it is not just the physical properties of OSM that activate these regions, but rather 
the process of object substitution itself, since an OSM display in which the target location is 
cued did not elicit the same magnitude of activations as when target location was 
unpredictable. But it is neither just brief nor difficult-to-see targets that activate these regions, 
since these effects were more marked in OSM as compared to backward pattern masking. 
They were still present for pattern masking, and this likely reflects a residual role of object 
substitution in such forms of masking (Weidner, et al., 2006). This suggests that V1 is an 
important locus of sensory input against which perceptual hypotheses are compared, which is 
not accounted for by Mumford’s (1991) model.  
 Lamme and Roelfsema (2000) popularised the notion of re-entrant processing and its 
critical importance in conscious object perception. According to this view, recurrent 
processing in early visual areas is a necessary condition for visual awareness. Whereas 
Mumford (1991) suggested that areas of the cortex have static functions and the thalamus is 
responsible for dynamic representations, according to Lamme and Roelfsema (2000) lateral 
and feedback connections allow cortical neurons to contribute different analyses of a visual 
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scene at different moments in time. Specifically, according to this model, the feedforward 
sweep reaches the highest levels of cortical processing within about 100ms of stimulus onset. 
Recurrent processing typically exerts its influence at relatively long latencies and is necessary 
for refining stimulus representations and rendering them accessible to visual awareness. 
Within this framework, a backward mask is thought to disrupt recurrent interactions between 
cortical areas by creating stimulus responses to the mask in lower areas that clash with those 
in higher areas. In support of this, backward masking has been found to leave the feedforward 
sweep of processing intact while selectively preventing feedback processing from extrastriate 
areas to V1 (Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2007; Lamme, Zipser, & Spekreijse, 2002).  
 Again, this model was developed as a general framework for visual processing rather 
than an explanation for OSM. However, it is consistent with the finding that an occipital P2 
component is elicited about 220 ms after stimulus onset in OSM, and this component was 
significantly correlated with target reportability (Kotsoni, Csibra, Mareschal, & Johnson, 
2007). Although the spatial resolution of ERPs is limited, the origin of this component and its 
timing is consistent with the notion of re-activation of primary visual cortex in order to refine 
the target representation, and that the greater this re-activation, the more likely the visual 
system will discard the perceptual representation of the target in favour of the mask-alone 
stimulus (Kotsoni, et al., 2007). However, while Lamme’s model provides a conceptual 
framework for understanding the dynamics of recurrent processing and its role in conscious 
vision, there are some aspects unique to OSM, as opposed to backward masking, which it 
does not specifically address, including the role of the distribution of attention and the effect 
of trailing mask duration. Di Lollo et al.’s (2000) model, however, was designed to do this.  
According to the re-entrant processing account of object substitution, OSM results 
from a conflict between abstract representations in higher level cortical areas and transient 
sensory input to V1 (Di Lollo, 2010, 2012; Di Lollo, et al., 2000; Enns & Di Lollo, 1997). 
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Under normal viewing conditions, in the first cycle of processing, input from the target array 
is encoded in V1, then proceeds to higher levels where tentative representations (or 
‘perceptual hypotheses’) about object identity are generated. However, such perceptual 
hypotheses require comparison against the high resolution and spatially-specific sensory 
information in V1 because these high-level representations are coarse or incomplete (low 
resolution), sensitivity to the location of the target stimulus is reduced due to the large 
receptive field size of neurons in higher areas, and ambiguity about object identity is created 
when multiple perceptual hypotheses are activated by the feedforward sweep. The circuit 
then checks, via ongoing re-entrant processing, for correlations between the descending codes 
representing multiple perceptual hypotheses, and the ongoing pattern of sensory activity. 
Perceptual hypotheses with low correlations are discarded, and ultimately, the representation 
with the highest correlation wins the competition for consciousness. Given the brief 
presentation of the target in OSM, when the descending signals arrive at V1, there is a 
mismatch between the perceptual hypothesis that represents the target and mask and the 
sensory activity representing the mask alone. This yields a low correlation for the perceptual 
hypothesis containing the target, which is then is discarded, and the hypothesis reflecting the 
mask-alone is ultimately consciously perceived (Di Lollo, 2010, 2012; Di Lollo, et al., 2000; 
Enns & Di Lollo, 1997, 2000).  
 This model predicts that OSM depends on set-size, owing to the number of iterations 
required to locate the target in the search array. If fewer iterations are required, then there are 
a greater number of re-entrant loops during which stimulus information about the target will 
still be lingering. In contrast, when a greater number of iterations are required to identify the 
target amongst distractors (i.e., at larger set-sizes), then the descending signals representing 
the target are more likely to overlap with the mask only sensory information, leading to a 
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lower correlation and thus the selection of the perceptual hypothesis consistent with just the 
mask being presented (Di Lollo, 2010; Di Lollo, et al., 2000).  
Di Lollo et al. (2000) developed and tested a computational model of object 
substitution (CMOS) in which a cortical hypercolumn in striate cortex (V1) connected to a 
corresponding region in an extrastriate visual area. This model posits iterative exchanges 
between fine-grained high spatial resolution sensory input information and more abstract 
pattern information that is lacking in spatial resolution which ultimately results in conscious 
perception. Specifically, it stipulates three main stages of processing. Firstly, there is the 
input layer (I), which, like V1, has small receptive fields, allowing for detailed and spatially-
precise coding of information. Secondly, there is an intermediate layer called the working 
space (W), thought to be part of the striate cortex, which has greater spatial resolution than I. 
Thirdly, there is the final pattern layer (P), purported to be in extrastriate cortex, which has 
large receptive field sizes, rendering it sensitive to the overarching pattern. At the onset of a 
stimulus, it is first encoded at I, then transferred to W, and a weighted sum of W and I are sent 
to P. P then outputs back to W, via this transfer, the pattern codes from P are translated into 
the pixel codes that predominate at W. Now W contains the pattern information that was 
represented in P, but it is in a form (pixel-based) that allows for direct comparison with the 
information at I. Then the contents of W are compared with the contents of I. Here, a “hill-
climbing algorithm” searches for the highest correlation between the pattern information 
from P that has been translated into W on the one hand and the sensory information in I on 
the other. This is achieved over successive iterations. Importantly, the fact that P receives 
input that is a weighted sum of the contents I and W (which is being fed back the 
representation from P) means that the patterns represented in P change more gradually than 
the rapid changes in sensory input that occur in response to physical stimulation changes (Di 
Lollo, et al., 2000). 
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CMOS performed reasonably well with r2 values between .78 and .98 being obtained 
when comparing the fits of the model to the psychophysical results (Di Lollo et al., 2000). 
However, Põder (in press) has since pointed out that CMOS is not actually a true instantiation 
of re-entrant processing, but instead, is essentially an attentional-gating model.  More 
critically, CMOS is limited in its ability to explain some important findings. Firstly, this 
model stipulates that set-size and mask duration interact, but when performance is 
unconstrained by ceiling effects, this interaction does not occur (Argyropoulos, et al., in 
press; Põder, in press). Secondly, it does not readily explain why prolonged exposure of 
placeholder stimuli in the target array can reduce masking (Guest, Gellatly, & Pilling, 2012).  
Põder (in press) developed a model which did not incorporate re-entrant processing 
and was designed to improve on the limitations of CMOS. This model assumes a pre-
attentive stage of processing that covers the target array, in addition to the basic mechanism 
of CMOS. Specifically, it assumes temporal integration of the target and mask signals, the 
strength of which is modulated by attention. When the two stimuli have a simultaneous 
offset, then the signals for both stimuli are likely to be preserved up until the object 
perception level. However, with the trailing mask-alone stimulus, the mask signals are 
present for a longer integration window, degrading the target representation and 
strengthening the mask representation, thereby impairing visibility of the target. After some 
time, when attention is focussed on the target location, the target is no longer accessible. The 
preattentive stage, however, means that some target information was acquired, and thus 
performance never declines to chance. Põder’s model provides an almost perfect fit for the 
behavioural data he modelled: r2 values of .99 were obtained when compared with Di Lollo et 
al.’s (2000) behavioural data and .98 when compared with Luiga and Bachmann’s (2008) 
results, pooled across polarity conditions. 
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The core advantage of Põder’s theory is that it that dovetails nicely with the important 
role of attention in OSM (Dux, et al., 2010) while not stipulating an interaction between set-
size and mask duration, which is a stumbling block for CMOS (Argyropoulos, et al., in 
press). That said, it still does not provide a complete account for the full gamut of OSM 
findings. For example, there are many object-updating effects in OSM (e.g., Hirose et al., 
2007), which we will discuss in the next section, on which this model is silent. Similarly, in 
its current form, this model does not predict the non-monotonicity which OSM functions can 
produce (Di Lollo, et al., 2000; Goodhew, Dux, Lipp, & Visser, 2012; Goodhew, Visser, 
Lipp, & Dux, 2011a): That is, with prolonged mask exposure (e.g., 640 ms), there can be an 
improvement in target identification accuracy relative to intermediate mask durations (e.g., 
240 ms) yielding a U-shaped function of masking across mask exposure (Goodhew, et al., 
2012; Goodhew, et al., 2011a). It should be noted, however, that recovery does not 
universally occur. In one case when an outline square mask was used and the task for 
participants was to detect the presence of an unbroken ring target amongst broken ring 
distractors, statistically significant recovery was not obtained (Tata & Giaschi, 2004). But 
there are considerable individual differences in the temporal dynamics of the OSM recovery 
function (Goodhew, et al., 2012), and possibly averaging across participants in the Tata and 
Giaschi study diluted the recovery effect. Consistent with this idea, there are trends towards 
recovery with prolonged mask exposure in some of Tata and Giaschi’s (2004) figures (see 
Figure 2, 8 mask condition; see Figure 4, no preview condition; Figure 6, no preview 
condition). Further evidence for the existence of recovery in OSM is that Di Lollo et al. 
(2000) also found such non-monotonicity with delayed offset of an annulus mask around a 
target with concurrent distractors in a trained observers, with this pattern most pronounced at 
smaller set-sizes (i.e., set-size 1). Perhaps, therefore, recovery is observed under particular 
conditions of perceptual degradation of the target, which may reflect the interplay of target 
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exposure duration, concurrent perceptual load, mask density/similarity to the target, and 
observer individual differences (e.g., working memory capacity). However, Põder’s model 
does not make any provision for the recovery effect.  
 There is a model that predicts non-monotonicity of OSM functions, as Bridgeman 
(2007) modified a single-layer model that relied on distributed stimulus representations to 
account for metacontrast masking (Bridgeman, 1971) in order to explain OSM. The model 
employed lateral inhibition between adjacent neurons at recurrent 30ms intervals, which is 
the latency of reciprocal lateral inhibition in the cat LGN (Singer & Creutzfeldt, 1970). The 
role of attention in masking is simulated in the model by varying the number of iterations 
over which neural net activity is collated. That is, fewer recurrent iterations occur for strongly 
attended items and a larger number for less strongly attended. This is a more plausible 
instantiation of attention than that employed in earlier attempts to adapt models of 
metacontrast masking to explain OSM, where attention was modelled via mask intensity 
(Francis & Hermens, 2002). While it is true that focussed attention generally reduces the 
effect of the trailing mask, mask intensity does not seem to capture what is meant by the 
nuanced construct that is ‘attention’, and, furthermore, it has been established that target 
perceptibility is largely unaffected by the relative intensity of the target versus mask (Neill, et 
al., 2002).  
Strong evidence in favour of Bridgeman’s (2007) model is that it produces U-shaped 
masking functions like those seen in recovery from OSM. The explanation for this pattern of 
masking is based on the timing of mask offset and target signals and their interaction within 
the model. That is, recovery occurs when the target is most closely attended (fewer 
iterations), preventing the mask offset transient from interfering with the target signal. But, 
when focussed attention is prevented (more iterations), the target and mask representations 
merge and produce masking. This neatly explains why Di Lollo et al. (2000) obtained non-
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monotonic masking across mask duration at set-size one (where there was still spatial 
uncertainty about target location): Here the target was more strongly attended relative to 
larger set-sizes. This theory, however, does not as readily explain why Goodhew et al (2012; 
2011a) obtained recovery at larger set-sizes, nor why recovery can occur with prolonged 
mask exposure in the absence of a mask offset prior to response delay or simply with delayed 
responses.  
Many of the models discussed above assume that feedforward and/or recurrent 
processing between visual and higher-level cortical regions is an essential component of 
conscious perception. Another prevailing view in cognitive neuroscience stipulates that the 
dorsal and ventral processing streams are differentially implicated in conscious and 
unconscious perception (Goodale, 2008; Goodale & Milner, 1992; Goodale & Westwood, 
2004). That is, the dorsal stream governs accurate visually-guided motor planning behaviour, 
which can be executed in the absence of conscious visual awareness. The ventral stream, in 
contrast, underlies conscious object perception. The classic example of this dissociation was 
provided by patient D.F. who suffered visual form agnosia after ventral occipital lesion: She 
was unable to recognise objects and yet her object-directed grasping remained intact (James, 
Culham, Humphreys, Milner, & Goodale, 2003). This same dissociation between visuomotor 
action and conscious perception has been demonstrated in OSM. That is, it has been found 
that normal motor reaching performance occurs even in the absence of conscious perception 
of the size of the target object (Binsted, Brownwell, Vorontsova, Heath, & Saucier, 2007; 
Heath, Neely, Yakimishyn, & Binsted, 2008).  
 The dorsal/ventral unconscious/conscious distinction, however, is not as absolute as 
initially conceived. In some of the earlier models of metacontrast masking, this interaction 
between the two processing channels was emphasised, especially how the magnocellular 
(transient) channel, which predominately innervates the dorsal stream, (Shapley, 1990), 
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disrupts processing of target-related information along the parvocellular (sustained) channel 
(which connects to the ventral stream) (Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976). More recent models, 
however, have established that magnocellular input can have a facilitatory effect on object 
perception (Bar et al., 2006).  
Breitmeyer and Ganz (1976) proposed the most influential and, for its time, the most 
physiologically plausible theory of metacontrast masking: The sustained-transient dual-
channel account. The feedforward, dual-channel architecture explains masking as a function 
of time between target and mask onsets and/or offsets. Both offsets and onsets activate the 
faster transient channel, which inhibits the slower sustained channel carrying information 
about stimulus identity (the transient/sustained maps onto the magnocellular/parvocellular 
distinction; Sherman, Wilson, Kaas, & Webb, 1976). In metacontrast masking, the sustained 
activity representing the target is inhibited by the rapid mask-induced transient when the 
mask onsets 50-100 ms after the target. At shorter SOAs, the mask-induced transient occurs 
prior to the target-related sustained response, and so does not interfere with it.  Similarly, at 
longer SOAs, the target-related sustained response is consolidated and thus impervious to the 
effect of the mask. While this model was initially designed to account for the U-shaped 
masking function that characterises metacontrast masking, it is also relevant to OSM. In 
OSM, there is typically constant (0 ms) target-mask SOA, and the one factor that varies is 
trailing mask duration, which concomitantly varies the temporal separation of mask offset 
from the target. This model, therefore, would predict a U-shaped function of OSM across 
mask duration (Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976; Breitmeyer & Kersey, 1981; Breitmeyer & 
Ögmen, 2006), which has been found (Goodhew, et al., 2011a). But, the U-shaped pattern 
also occurs in the absence of mask offset or just with a response delay after mask offset 
(Goodhew, et al., 2012), which cannot be explained within the sustained-transient framework. 
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More recently, Tapia and Breitmeyer (2011) compared behavioural responses to 
known response properties of magnocellular and parvocellular neurons. Observers were 
presented with either a visible or invisible (rendered so by a metacontrast mask) prime arrow 
(pointing left or right) at different contrasts, followed by a probe arrow. Their task was to 
identify whether the probe arrow was pointing left or right as quickly and accurately as 
possible. Prime visibility was assessed in a separate identification block, and they found that 
the function of the effect of the prime across contrast was best approximated by the known 
properties of magnocellular neurons for consciously perceived visible primes, whereas the 
effect of the prime was best explained by the known properties of parvocellular neurons for 
the unconsciously perceived primes. These authors suggested that the role of the 
magnocellular channel in conscious vision is to generate feedback to IT areas that is 
necessary for rendering stimuli accessible to visual awareness.  
 A similar idea was previously described in more detail by Bar (2003), who proposed 
that ‘hypothesis generation’ in object recognition is subserved by a magnocellular input 
directly into prefrontal cortex, which generates a preliminary ‘guess’ about the identity of an 
object in advance of the feedforward sweep. This then initiates re-entrant activity from 
prefrontal cortex to object-related areas in IT, amplifying the sensory input in these regions 
that is consistent with the perceptual representation, which then facilitates rapid object 
recognition. In support of this, activity in orbitofrontal cortex preceded (by about 50ms) 
activity in more classical object-related areas (temporal cortex, including fusiform gyrus and 
LOC), and moreover, this activity was predictive of subsequent behavioural object 
recognition reported by the observer (Bar, et al., 2006). Consistent with the magnocellular’s 
channel preference for low spatial frequency (LSF) content of stimuli (Derrington & Lennie, 
1984), both the unfiltered and low-pass spatial frequency filtered images generated equivalent 
activity in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and induced greater synchronization between 
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feedforward and feedback projections, whereas this was not so for high-pass filtered images. 
Thus, conscious perception is the not exclusive domain of the ventral cortical stream.  
In sum, both the qualitative re-entrant processing account and its purported 
computational instantiation (CMOS) have difficulty explaining the nuances of OSM. While 
initial attempts to model OSM without recourse to re-entrant processing fell short of 
accurately operationalizing important concepts like attention (Francis & Hermens, 2002), 
more recent developments have provided excellent predictive value in a way that is 
theoretically sound (Põder, in press). Bridgeman’s (2007) model does one of the best jobs in 
approximating the behavioural data of OSM, but this is a model of recurrent lateral inhibition 
rather than feedback between different regions. However, the physiological reality is that the 
brain has substantial architecture for re-entrant processing, and much evidence points to this 
being involved in conscious perception (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). Re-entrant processing 
is therefore likely to be involved in some way in rendering the target stimulus accessible to 
visual awareness, it just may not be via the specific mechanisms proposed in the re-entrant 
processing account of OSM (Di Lollo et al., 2000). For example, it may be that the visual 
competition between the target and mask is resolved via recurrent lateral inhibition, and re-
entrant processing is subsequently responsible for rendering either just the mask, or both the 
target and mask accessible to perceptual consciousness. Furthermore, we believe that in the 
future, models will benefit from synthesising growing knowledge of the role of the 
magnocellular/dorsal stream in conscious object perception (e.g, Bar, 2003; Bar, et al., 2006). 
For example, it may be the preattentive sweep proposed by Põder is a magnocellular-
mediated ‘first guess’ at target object identity.  
Object-updating and object substitution  
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According to the object-updating account, OSM reflects the conditions in which the 
target and mask are integrated into a single object representation, thereby obscuring the 
visibility of the target. As we will discuss in this section, there is a wealth of evidence that 
encouraging the formation of independent object representations for the target and mask 
reduces OSM. But in order for this to be a compelling explanation, it needs to describe how 
integrating the target and mask objects would render the target unavailable to awareness, 
since the target and mask never share a common spatial location. It may be the case that the 
space inside the four dots is not treated as transparent, but part of the four-dot object in its 
own right. Evidence for this assertion is that when the four stimuli constituting the mask are 
arranged in such a way as to induce an illusory contour, masking occurred when this was 
stimulus appeared immediately adjacent to the target, but not when it appeared elsewhere in 
the display (Hirose & Osaka, 2009). Furthermore, when a stereoscope is used to induce the 
perception that the target and mask appear in different depth planes, masking only occurs 
when the mask is perceived to be in front of the target (Kahan & Lichtman, 2006). This 
suggests that the target representation is fused not just with four dots, but with an illusory 
contour created by the four-dot mask, and this obscures the visibility of the target.  
In support of the role of object updating in OSM, Lleras and Moore (2003) 
demonstrated that OSM critically depends on the mask constituting a robust continuing object 
representation within the timeframe that allows the target to be integrated with it. Their 
design utilised apparent motion - where two static stimuli flashed close in space and time 
create the percept of motion in the absence of actual motion (Anstis, 1980). Specifically, in 
their experiments, the target array (presented for 17-34 ms) contained eight ‘Cs’ (varying in 
orientation), arranged in a circle, with every item surrounded by four dots. The target was 
signalled by being a darker shade of grey than the distractors, and participants’ were 
instructed to report the orientation of the target C. In addition to a baseline condition 
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(standard simultaneous offset condition), there were also three different delayed mask offset 
conditions. There was a standard delayed mask offset condition; a condition where the masks 
always offset simultaneously with the target, and then re-appeared at a new spatial location 
(all masks moved together out into a circle with a larger circumference) after a duration that 
was conducive to the percept of apparent motion (17-34 ms; short-ISI) - and finally, there 
was a similar condition where the masks reappeared after a longer delay (216-233 ms; long-
ISI) which was not conducive to eliciting apparent motion. Comparing target identification 
accuracy in each condition against the simultaneous offset baseline, it was found that 
masking occurred in the standard delayed offset condition and in the apparent motion 
condition, but not in the condition where apparent motion was not observed. This suggests 
that when the mask is perceived as a continuing object, it results in OSM, but when the mask 
appears as a new object that onsets after the target offsets, it does not.  
Pilling and Gellatly (2010) recently extended Lleras and Moore’s (2003) paradigm. 
These authors used a condition akin to that employed in short-ISI trials described above, and 
assessed the effect of adding another presentation of the mask dots at an outer-most location 
in between the two successive displays previously used in that condition. The logic here was 
that this should disrupt the perception that the dots were a re-appearance of the mask that was 
presented during the target array, and would instead encourage the percept that these were 
new objects. This, therefore, should allow the visual system to determine that the target and 
mask were separate object identities, and consequently reduce masking. This is indeed what 
was found: Masking was reduced with the additional presentation of the dots compared to the 
standard short-ISI condition (Pilling & Gellatly, 2010).  
Moore and Lleras (2005) found that additional manipulations that encourage the 
visual system to treat the target and mask as a single versus two separate objects also affected 
masking. Specifically, in Experiment 1, the authors used motion to encourage either common 
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or separate object representations. In one condition, the mask appeared at a different location 
to the target, then moved past the location of the target when it was present, and then moved 
on to a new location after target offset (i.e., separated target and mask objects). In the other 
condition, after the mask onset at a different location to the target, it then appeared to move in 
conjunction with the target, rather than slide past its location (i.e., target and mask objects not 
separate). Masking was greater for the latter compared to the former condition. In Experiment 
2, the independence of the target and mask objects was manipulated via coherent versus 
incoherent motion. The trials began with placeholders: Filled circles (rather than circles with 
gaps - Cs), with four-dot masks around each of them (the placeholders gave no cue as to the 
subsequent location of the target). Then, the arrays (both circles and dots) briefly moved. 
They either did so together (coherent motion), or independently of one another (incoherent 
motion). After the placeholders stopped moving, the target array was presented. Stronger 
masking occurred after exposure to motion which implied that the four dots and the circles 
were a coherent object compared with that after viewing a pattern of motion implying that the 
circles and dots were separate objects. Again, this suggests that a failure of target and mask 
object individuation contributes to OSM (Lleras & Moore, 2005).  
Finally, in Experiment 3, the target and mask were either coloured identically or 
appeared in different colours to one another (Lleras & Moore, 2005). This was done on the 
assumption that when the target and mask were identically coloured, they should be more 
likely to be treated as belonging to a single object token compared with when they were 
differently coloured. It was found that masking was weaker when the target and mask were 
coloured differently. To the extent that featural similarity acts as an object-individuation cue, 
this is consistent with the object-updating account (Lleras & Moore, 2005). Moreover, it has 
been shown that rTMS applied to V5/MT+ reduces masking (Hirose et al., 2007). This 
dovetails with object-updating account, since V5/MT+ processes motion (Born & Bradley, 
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2005), which inherently involves updating the location of an object over time. Temporarily 
deactivating this function may reduce object-updating, and this might explain the decrease in 
masking.  
Mask preview findings also provide converging evidence for the crucial role of object 
individuation computations in OSM. In the mask-preview paradigm, the target display 
includes four-dot masks around all items (both target and distractors). Since the masks 
surround all the stimuli, they are not predictive of the location of the target amongst the 
distractors in the subsequent array and thus do not simply serve as a precue to target location 
(which is also known to attenuate masking; see Di Lollo et al., 2000). Despite this, the non-
predictive preview of the mask objects (and targets) reduces masking (Neill, et al., 2002). It 
has been hypothesised that this occurs because the preview consolidates the representation of 
the masks as a separate object identity, protecting against subsequent integration of the target 
and mask items. In addition to mask preview, prolonged exposure of the target array (in the 
absence of the cue indicating which item in the array is the target) decreases masking strength 
(Gellatly, Pilling, Carter, & Guest, 2010). Again, it has been suggested that the pre-exposure 
of the target array aids in the individuation the target object’s representation, thus making it 
resistant to being confused with that of the mask (Gellatly et al., 2010). These authors have 
also shown that even when placeholders are used in lieu of the target and mask objects in the 
preview array, this reduction in masking still occurs, illustrating that effect is not just the 
result of the previewed stimuli being loaded into visual short-term memory (Guest, et al., 
2012).   
As noted above, prolonged mask exposure after the target offset can also reduce 
masking (Goodhew, et al., 2012; Goodhew, et al., 2011a). How would the object-updating 
framework explain this? As discussed above, recovery of the object representation is obtained 
when the mask does not offset prior to a response being made, and with a blank response 
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delay (Goodhew, et al., 2012). This illustrates the importance of time in the recovery effect - 
with sufficient processing time (untied to any further physical stimulation) the target 
representation can be accessed. Crucially, both in the conditions where there is a trailing 
mask and when the screen is blank the visual system has a period of time during which no 
new stimulation onsets. We suspect that this period of time allows the mask representation to 
be consolidated in its own right, consequently preventing it from being fused with the target.  
Our suggestion is that object-updating reflects a limitation in the temporal resolution 
of visual encoding. This means that any manipulation which transiently increases the 
temporal precision of encoding should thwart OSM. One way to do this is to place visual 
stimuli in near-hand space. It was initially proposed that near-hand space incurs enhanced 
attentional processing (Reed, Betz, Garza, & Roberts, 2010; Reed, Grubb, & Steele, 2006) or 
reduced attentional disengagement (Abrams, Davoli, Du, Knapp, & Paull, 2008).  More 
recently, however, there has been evidence to suggest it is the purview of upregulated 
contribution of the magnocellular channel – which has greater temporal resolution but poorer 
spatial encoding relative to its parvocellular counterpart (Gozli, West, & Pratt, 2012). 
Increased temporal resolution implies that the visual system should be especially likely to 
encode the target and mask as separate objects and it has recently been demonstrated that 
OSM is indeed reduced at such locations (Goodhew, Gozli, Ferber, & Pratt, in press). This is 
consistent with the notion that OSM reflects overzealous temporal fusion of two object 
identities.    
 It has also been suggested that the object-updating account is distinct from the object 
substitution account, as the former predicts that the target and mask are fused into a single 
object representation, whereas the latter that two separate object tokens (target and mask) 
compete for access to consciousness (Di Lollo, et al., 2000; Guest, Gellatly, & Pilling, 2011). 
Essentially, it is a question of whether the visual system encodes the target and mask as a 
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single or two separate events. Recently Guest, Gellatly and Pilling (2011) argued that they 
had found evidence in favour of object substitution. These authors found that OSM was 
strongest when the four dots surrounded the target (as per conventional OSM), and was 
weakened when the dots were instead placed overlapping the critical target feature. These 
authors argued that this is because OSM reflects spatial competition for consciousness 
between the whole target and mask object. But this finding is also easily explained by the 
object-updating framework. A common alignment of the target and mask stimuli (as in the 
standard OSM condition) would be especially conducive to them being confused as 
belonging to a single object identity as opposed to when they were spatially offset. Thus, the 
results of Guest et al. (2011) can be taken as evidence against the notion that the target and 
mask representations interact at an isolated featural level (e.g., Kahan & Enns, 2010), but 
they are entirely consistent with the existing evidence for the object-updating account. It 
remains to be seen, therefore, whether there are findings in OSM that can only be explained 
by object-substitution, and not object-updating. It is telling, however, that the neural models 
that fared best in predicting behavioural OSM results (Bridgeman, 2007; Põder, in press) 
posit integration (as opposed to substitution) of the target and mask stimulus information as 
the core mechanism underlying OSM.   
OSM and object correspondence  
It has long been noted that object representations play a key role in OSM (e.g., Lleras 
& Moore, 2003; Moore & Lleras, 2005). But, is there a link between OSM and one of the 
fundamental challenges of vision in everyday life? That is, humans make several eye 
movements a second (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1998), and objects themselves move in the 
environment. This means the brain receives visual information that is constantly being 
interrupted and in a state of flux. Yet, despite this, our subjective sense of the world is one of 
stability and continuity. This demonstrates that the brain transforms the dynamic and 
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impoverished input into stable recognisable object representations. It would be a confusing 
world if the visual system treated all changes in stimulation as new objects. This would mean, 
for example, that making a saccade to another object in between two fixations would 
obliterate any recognition of persisting identity. 
While maintaining object identities is important, the brain cannot indiscriminately 
compute continuing object identity. In some instances, objects do change: An object at one 
location may be replaced by another, and it is equally important to appreciate when a new 
object appears on the scene as to maintain object identities when they persist. Thus, making 
an inference of correspondence versus non-correspondence under conditions of ambiguous 
input is a key challenge for the visual system. Some paradigms exist for approaching this 
question, which are discussed below, but it is plausible that OSM cuts to the core of this 
process as this phenomenon involves presenting observers with two instantiations of a visual 
stimulus – the first of which contains the target object, as well as surrounding visual 
information – followed by the second which just contains the surrounding visual information. 
This means the brain is confronted with the need to draw an object correspondence (or non-
correspondence) inference, and, we suggest, on masked trials this ambiguity is resolved in 
favour of a judgement that just a single object appeared throughout the presentation and 
consequently the target is suppressed from visual awareness. That is, the observer has no 
sense of having seen the target object at all, and when forced to respond, cannot accurately 
identify it. According to this perspective, when the target and mask are temporally fused, it is 
not a flaw of the system, but rather reflects the operation of a mechanism that allows us to 
maintain coherent object identity representations through time and across change.  
Why, according to this perspective, does spatial attention play a role in OSM? This 
could be explained in that it serves to lower the resolution of the forms being encoded to such 
an extent that the target plus mask representation is more likely to be perceptually confused 
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with the mask-alone representation. It is already known that attention increases the spatial 
resolution of visual encoding (Yeshurun & Carrasco, 1998, 1999, 2008). Thus, in OSM, the 
fact that spatial attention cannot be readily focussed on the target would decrease any featural 
dissimilarity between the target and mask. This, in turn, would increase the likelihood that 
they would be deemed to be two instantiations of a single object.  
There is another aspect of attention in OSM – that attention to the mask increases 
masking (Neill, et al., 2002) – which has been argued to be necessary for OSM to be 
observed (Tata & Giaschi, 2004). However, it is not necessary for the mask to be a singleton 
and ‘pop-out’ in the target array, since OSM is obtained even when four-dots surround all 
target locations and the target is instead signalled by appearing in a different colour to the 
distractors (e.g., Lleras & Moore, 2003). From the object correspondence perspective, 
attention to the mask likely serves two important purposes. Firstly, it enhances the strength of 
the mask’s stimulation, increasing the likelihood that the target instantiation, with relatively 
less strength, will be subject to integration rather than be treated as a discrete object. When 
the mask surrounding the target is not a singleton, the longer duration of the mask relative to 
the target likely serves the same purpose. Secondly, when integration occurs, attention to the 
mask ensures that it is the stimulus that dominates in the integration. Otherwise, if the 
representation of the mask were equally weak as the target, then integration could occur in 
favour of the target.  That is, the target plus mask and subsequent trailing mask could be 
treated as a single instance of the target plus mask object rather than the mask alone stimulus. 
If such integration occurred, it would of course not be evident as an impairment in target 
visibility, but instead an impairment in mask visibility. Attention to the mask may preclude 
this possibility, and instead OSM reflects the integration of the target and mask into a single 
object representation that largely reflects the mask alone stimulus.  
Relationship between OSM and other visual-cognitive phenomena  
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Although OSM has unique features that are not shared with other paradigms, the basic 
mechanisms that produce OSM may overlap with those underlying other visual-cognitive 
phenomena, especially other ‘failures of awareness’ (Kim & Blake, 2005). 
Metacontrast masking 
There are obvious superficial differences between metacontrast masking and OSM. 
For example, mask duration is held constant in metacontrast masking with only SOA being 
varied, whereas OSM conventionally involves the common onset of the target and mask (i.e., 
a SOA of equals zero). It has been demonstrated, however, that when mask duration is varied, 
metacontrast masking magnitude increases over the durations 0-160ms (Di Lollo, von 
Muhlenen, Enns, & Bridgeman, 2004), and over these durations OSM shows the same 
pattern. Furthermore, inducing a delay between the stimulus and the response can reduce 
metacontrast masking when the SOA between the target and mask is zero (Lachter & Durgin, 
1999), and common-onset OSM shows a similar improvement with response delay (Goodhew 
et al., 2012). But, ultimately, as described previously, there is empirical evidence that OSM 
and metacontrast masking are indeed dissociable, with metacontrast masking having an 
earlier locus of suppression (Chakravarthi & Cavanagh, 2009).  
When it comes to the role of attention, however, we might think of the distinction 
between OSM and metacontrast as one of degree, rather than kind. Whereas OSM is critically 
dependent on the dispersal of attention during target exposure, metacontrast masking is not, 
although it is modulated by attention. That is, metacontrast masking is obtained even with a 
centrally presented and attended target; in fact, this is the arrangement in which metacontrast 
masking is traditionally used (Alpern, 1952, 1953; Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006). However, 
the magnitude of metacontrast masking increases when spatial attention is dispersed during 
the presentation of the target (e.g., number of distractors in the target array) and attenuated 
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when rapid attention to the target is facilitated in such arrays (Shelley-Tremblay & Mack, 
1999; Tata, 2002). While the label ‘metacontrast masking’ was not used, this interaction 
between attention and metacontrast masking was first noticed decades ago. Averbach and 
Coriell (1961) used a partial-report paradigm (similar to Sperling, 1960) in which a 2 x 4 
array of letters was presented briefly, and after a variable delay, a visual cue was used to 
signal the target. When the visual cue was a circle that appeared around the location that had 
contained the target letter, these authors found an unexpected impairment in the visibility of 
the target letter that conformed to a U-shaped function across target-cue SOA (Averbach & 
Coriell, 1961). It is noteworthy that when attention was spread over the target array, a circle 
could serve as a mask for letters, even though these have somewhat different contours.  
Why, then, does attention affect metacontrast masking? And why does the 
requirement for similarity of the contours of the target and mask appear to become more 
flexible under conditions of distributed spatial attention? We believe it is for the same reason 
that four dots can mask almost any stimulus in OSM when focussed attention on the target is 
precluded: Under these conditions the representation of the target is of sufficiently low 
spatiotemporal resolution that it can be confused for a prior instantiation of the trailing mask, 
rather than an object in its own right. When metacontrast masking occurs centrally, the 
greater spatiotemporal resolution of central vision demands that the target and mask have 
similar contours and appear in very close spatial proximity in order for them to become 
perceptually confusable. Once we move into the periphery or conditions under which 
attention is not focussed on the target, however, this facilitates the perceptual decision that 
the target and mask reflect two instantiations of a single object representation, and thus the 
requirement for precise physical similarity between the target and mask is relaxed. 
 Backward masking 
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Similarities between OSM and metacontrast masking have often been noted; given 
both phenomena appear to reflect a low-resolution target representation being integrated with 
that of the mask. It also appears, however, that backward pattern masking, where the mask 
spatially overlaps the target, may at least partially tap similar mechanisms (Di Lollo et al., 
2000; first proposed this link). For example, it has been found that backward masking is 
differentially exacerbated when the perceptual quality of the target is already degraded, such 
as with object occlusion (Wyatte, Curran, & O'Reilly, 2012). Further evidence for object-
updating in backward masking is that when the overlapping mask consists of systematically 
alternating black and white squares, (and thus its form is more easily discernible when the 
mask is overlaid), it is a less effective mask than one that has exactly the same number of 
black and white squares but has them arranged in an random, unsystematic way (Coltheart & 
Arthur, 1972). This is evidence that the target and mask are integrated into a single percept, 
and the mask that provides better camouflage when they are merged is more effective at 
obscuring target visibility. If the purpose of the mask was merely to terminate further 
processing of the target, then the nature of the mask itself should be irrelevant. This suggests 
that integration of the target and mask representations plays a role in backward masking.  
Change blindness 
Attentional limitations that impoverish the quality of perceptual representations and 
render them vulnerable to integration is apparent in many other visual-cognitive phenomena. 
For example, change blindness refers to the finding that observers often fail to see large 
changes in a scene (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997; Simons & Levin, 1998). Specifically, 
when two versions of a scene are presented in alternation - an exact version and a version 
with a significant change to an object in the scene - with an irrelevant image (e.g., grey 
screen), observers have difficulty in detecting the change/difference (Rensink et al., 1997). 
However, the irrelevant image interleaved between the two versions of the scene is not 
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necessary to produce change blindness as the effect can be observed with the scene being 
continuously present, if visual noise stimuli (‘mudsplashes’) are added to the scene 
concurrently with the change, even though they do not obscure the target (O'Regan, Rensink, 
& Clark, 1999). Change detection may be related to OSM because when attention and 
processing resources are occupied elsewhere, the critical event (the change to the scene in 
change blindness, or the target in OSM) is encoded with poor spatiotemporal resolution, 
making it missed entirely, or susceptible to integration. In this sense, we support the notion 
that attention represents a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for visual awareness 
(Cohen, Cavanagh, Chun, & Nakayama, 2012), rather than the alternative that spatial 
attention and perceptual consciousness reflect distinct operations (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007, 
2012).  
Object correspondence through occlusion  
 If OSM does indeed reflect the operation of mechanisms involved in integrating 
(versus segregating) object identities, then there should be converging evidence between 
OSM and other traditional studies of object correspondence. On closer examination of the 
literature, such convergence is apparent. Many laboratory object correspondence tasks 
involve the presentation of two suprathreshold events, before and after occlusion. For 
example, a green circle travels across the screen (event one), disappears behind an occluder, 
and then remerges on the other side (event two). The extent to which observers perceive the 
emerging object as the same object that disappeared behind the occluder can be gauged with 
subjective report of perceived object identity persistence (Burke, 1952), indirectly via an 
objective change detection task (Hollingworth & Franconeri, 2009), or the end location of 
saccades (Richard, Luck, & Hollingworth, 2008). Alternatively, some studies have used 
apparent motion, but such tasks usually employ similar dependent measures, such as report 
on the nature or direction of motion (Green & Odom, 1986; Hein & Moore, 2012).  
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 What properties of the events need to match in order for a persisting object identity 
(rather than two discrete objects) to be perceived? Both an object’s surface features and its 
spatiotemporal history make independent contributions to object correspondence across 
occlusion by another object (Hollingworth & Franconeri, 2009), saccades (Richard, et al., 
2008), and apparent motion events (Hein & Moore, 2012). It is interesting, therefore, that 
results in the OSM paradigm converge on the same conclusion: While the mask’s 
spatiotemporal trajectory influences masking (e.g., Lleras & Moore, 2003), so does its 
features. For example, masking strength is modulated by whether the target and mask are the 
same colour (Moore & Lleras, 2005) or the same luminance (Luiga & Bachmann, 2008), 
such that masking is greater when the target and mask had common features compared to 
when they had conflicting features. This convergence between traditional measures of object 
correspondence and OSM suggests that they may tap common operations.  
 Visual Short-Term Memory   
Object-updating implies that on at least a proportion of trials, the first event (i.e., the 
target) and the second event are stored in order for a comparison to take place. What memory 
store mediates this process? Visual short-term memory (VSTM) is a store in which about 
three to four bound objects are stored and explicitly reportable (Luck & Vogel, 1997). 
However, masking is affected by mechanisms other than loading information into VSTM 
(Guest, et al., 2012), and ERP evidence suggests that targets which fail to be reported in OSM 
are not encoded into VSTM (Prime, Pluchino, Eimer, Dell'Acqua, & Jolicoeur, 2011). Thus, 
VSTM does not appear to be the most likely candidate.   
An alternate store, visible persistence, is a briefly-lingering low-level stimulus 
representation that is extinguished within approximately 100-200ms of stimulus offset 
(Coltheart, 1980; Di Lollo, 1980; Hogben & Di Lollo, 1974). However, manipulations that 
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occur beyond this time window still influence OSM (Goodhew, et al., 2012; Goodhew, et al., 
2011a; Lleras & Moore, 2003). Informational persistence (also known as iconic memory) is 
preserved for longer durations, and lingering informational persistence is typically gauged 
with cue after target offset, which is the first point at which the to-be-reported target is 
differentiated from distractors (Sperling, 1960). In OSM, the location of the target is cued 
from the time of exposure. Informational persistence, furthermore, is purported to be an 
abstract representation, and yet we know that improvement with prolonged mask exposure is 
extinguished when a backward pattern mask overlaps the spatial location of the target, 
suggesting that even at long durations it is a visual, rather than informational (Goodhew, et 
al., 2011a). Consistent with this, since OSM appears to fundamentally reflect object 
integration mechanisms, it would make most sense for the target representation to be a mid-
level representation, like that of the ‘object token’, a marker for an identity whose location 
can be updated over time, and whose features are irrelevant (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 
1992). Unlike the representation suggested by Kahneman et al., however, the representation 
here appears to retain featural information (Luiga & Bachmann, 2008; Moore & Lleras, 
2005). 
It is worth noting that Brockmole and colleagues (Brockmole, Irwin, & Wang, 2003; 
Brockmole & Wang, 2003; Brockmole, Wang, & Irwin, 2002) found that performance on a 
temporal integration task follows a curvilinear function much like OSM. These studies used 
the missing-dot paradigm, in which observers were presented with two successive matrices of 
dots (e.g., 4 x 4 grid) separated by variable intervals. If the matrices were overlaid, all of the 
locations were filled except one. Observers’ task was to identify this location (i.e., find the 
missing dot). It was found that missing-dot localisation accuracy was maximal at an inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) of 0 ms between the to-be-integrated images, declined across the first 
100ms or so, and then steadily increased over the course of at least another 1000ms. 
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Brockmole et al. suggested that this was evidence that the visual system is capable of 
integrating a currently-maintained visual image with perceptual information, and that the 
prolonged timescale over which this occurs is due to sluggish mechanisms for generating a 
consolidated first image.  
 
More recent work, however, has shown that consolidation of an image in such 
missing-dot tasks takes about 200ms (Jiang, 2004), and that after 500ms the visual system 
maintains separate representations of each array in VSTM (Jiang & Kumar, 2004). This is 
somewhat dissimilar to Brockmole’s timecourse, but still not inconsistent with OSM. 
Recovery from OSM peaks by 640ms after target exposure (Goodhew et al., 2012), so by this 
point there may be separate representations for the target and mask available, which may 
even be stored in VSTM. But of greater interest is the nature of the target representation 
before this, in the form that allows for object integration. Recently it has been suggested that 
the most efficient way to perform the missing-dot task is to memorise the location in which 
there are not dots and compare this with the second array, meaning that the task is not tapping 
true perceptual integration (Hollingworth, Hyun, & Zhang, 2005; Jiang, Kumar, & Vickery, 
2005), casting doubt on the ability of the results from this paradigm to inform our 
understanding of OSM. Thus, we have not yet identified the precise nature of the memory 
representation in OSM, but it has several important characteristics – visual in form, contains 
both featural and spatiotemporal information, relatively long in duration, and, as we shall see 
in the next section, capable of activating semantic-level recognition of the target. 
The fate of masked targets in OSM 
Focussing on the mechanism that suppresses the target from, or catapults it into, 
visual awareness is vital for understanding OSM and, indeed, vision in general. Equally 
important, however, is assessing unconscious vision – that is, the level of processing of the 
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masked target. This final section will review the evidence regarding the fate of masked 
targets in OSM.  
How do salient stimuli fare as targets in OSM? One example of such a stimulus 
category is the human face. Processing of faces is associated with increased negativity over 
occipito-temporal electrode sites about 130-200 ms after stimulus presentation (Bentin, 
Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996). This component of the event-related potential 
(ERP) is known as the N170 and it is thought to reliably predict the conscious perception of a 
stimulus as a face. The delayed offset of a four-dot mask has been found to obliterate the 
N170 (Reiss & Hoffman, 2007), suggesting that OSM impairs early levels of visual analysis. 
Examination of Reiss and Hoffman’s (2007) data presented in their paper, however, reveals 
that while there was no difference in the amplitude of the waveforms triggered by masked 
face versus house stimuli in the couple of hundred milliseconds after the target, a systematic 
and sustained difference did appear to emerge several hundred milliseconds later - beyond the 
time window of analysis for the N170. This suggests that there could be an 
electrophysiological correlate of faces that are processed (to the level that they are 
differentiated from other objects, such as houses) and yet not consciously perceived due to 
masking. However, a limitation of this study is that the authors did not separately compare on 
a trial-by-trial basis when participants were aware of the target and when they were not. Since 
masking was not complete (target identification accuracy 70.4% where chance is 50%), this 
means that on a considerable portion of trials in the ‘masking’ condition, participants would 
have actually been aware of the target. This means that the ERP difference could be driven by 
target awareness on those trials. As it stands, this work is not definitive on the fate of 
unconscious stimuli in OSM.  
While it remains unclear whether faces are perceived during OSM, features of objects 
clearly are processed. Chen and Treisman (2009) conducted a series of experiments 
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investigating the level of implicit processing in OSM. These authors found that when the 
target and mask stimuli were featurally identical (e.g., left-pointing double-headed arrows, 
[<<]), response times to identify the mask were facilitated compared with when they were 
different (e.g., target left-pointing and mask right-pointing arrows), even for targets that were 
missed on a target detection task. This demonstrates that there is processing of the basic 
physical features of the target, even in the absence of explicit perceptual awareness (Chen & 
Treisman, 2009). They attempted to assess the level of implicit semantic perception in 
subsequent experiments using isolated letter stimuli and defining compatibility in a somewhat 
arbitrary manner (vowels versus consonants) that did not reflect the way we typically 
categorise or process letters. Typically, we see them as parts of words, and rapidly extract the 
meaning of those words. Thus, what Chen and Treisman essentially showed is that there is 
not implicit processing of the vowel/consonant distinction in OSM. But when word stimuli 
are used, there is evidence for implicit semantic perception of suppressed targets.  
In order to capture the richness of abstract meaning, Goodhew et al. (2011b; 
Experiment 2) used target words (PINK, BLUE, HOUR, MAIL, coloured grey), and masked 
them with four coloured dots (all either coloured pink or blue on a given trial),with (####) as 
distractors. Targets were present on 50% of trials, and the mask had either a simultaneous or 
delayed (200 ms) offset. Participants’ task was to 1) make a speeded mask colour judgement 
(pink versus blue), and 2) make an unspeeded target detection task. Compatibility was 
defined as the relationship between the semantic meaning of the target word and the colour of 
the mask. That is, when the target word was present, on some trials the semantic meaning of 
the target matched the colour of the four dots (e.g., ‘PINK’ inside pink dots; compatible), on 
others, the semantic meaning of the target mismatched the colour of the four dots (e.g., 
‘PINK’ inside blue dots; incompatible), and on other still there were non-colour words were 
neutral with respect to the colour of the four dot mask. Crucially, the only variable that 
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differed across the compatible, neutral and incompatible trials was the semantic relationship 
between the target and the coloured dots – featurally, the conditions were equivalent (four 
black letters inside coloured dots).  
Target detection was impaired for delayed relative to simultaneous offset trials. On 
the delayed mask offset trials, when the target was correctly detected, response times were 
significantly faster on the compatible compared to the incompatible trials, with neutral words 
yielding intermediate response times. When the target was missed, the opposite pattern was 
observed – response times were significantly faster for incompatible compared to compatible 
trials. This ‘negative compatibility effect’ (NCE) (Bennett, Lleras, Oriet, & Enns, 2007; 
Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998) is striking, and demonstrates different processing in conscious 
and unconscious vision (see Goodhew et al., 2011b, for discussion of this effect). But the 
most important finding was that a systematic relationship between the meaning of the target 
and response times to the mask, indicating that the target word was processed to the level of 
semantics, despite failing to be detected. This demonstrates that there is implicit semantic 
perception in OSM (Goodhew, et al., 2011b).  
 The conclusion that there is implicit semantic perception may seem at odds with the 
findings that OSM abolishes the N400 to word targets (Reiss & Hoffman, 2006), an event-
related potential used as an electrophysiological signature of semantic processing (Kutas & 
Hillyard, 1980). However, if we examine Reiss and Hoffman’s (2006) methodology, we find 
that these results are also not definitive regarding the level of processing in OSM. These 
authors had participants read a context word followed by a semantically related or unrelated 
target word surrounded by dots. The participants then identified the target from multiple 
display options. The delayed mask offset impaired target identification performance and 
while the differential amplitude of the N400 to semantically-related versus unrelated words 
was present for the consciously perceived targets, it was abolished in the delayed offset 
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condition. While these results point toward OSM impairing semantic processing, there are a 
couple of limitations of this study. Firstly, the authors did not compare perceptually aware 
versus unaware trials, instead grouping all delayed mask offset trials together for the analysis. 
This makes it possible that any effect for unaware trials was obscured, especially if it differed 
qualitatively from that for aware trials. Secondly, there was, in fact, some behavioural 
evidence for implicit semantic perception – responses were significantly more accurate for 
compatible trials (context and target word semantically related) compared to incompatible 
trials, but this is difficult to interpret, since as the authors acknowledged, it could be 
attributed to a guessing bias. Thus, this study, as it stands, does not conclusively reveal the 
fate of the masked target in OSM.  
To summarise, the evidence indicates that (a) successfully masked targets in OSM are 
nonetheless implicitly processed at both the basic physical feature and higher-level abstract 
semantic level, and (b) there is a qualitative difference in the effect of the perceived versus 
missed targets at the semantic level. This is not because the missed targets failed to be 
processed - this would result in an absence of priming on the miss trials. Instead, there was 
strong priming, but it differed qualitatively in nature from the pattern when the target was 
visible.  
Conclusion  
 OSM has been an exciting development in visual masking techniques that are used for 
understanding the mechanisms of conscious visual perception. It appears to tap properties of 
the visual system that are common to multiple paradigms, including metacontrast masking, 
backward masking, change blindness, change detection, and object correspondence through 
occlusion, to name but a few. That is, when focal attention to the target is prevented, this 
stimulus is encoded with sufficiently low spatiotemporal resolution that it is perceptually 
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confused for a prior instantiation of the mask. Ultimately, we conclude that OSM reflects a 
perceptual decision to a fundamental problem in visual cognition: whether stimulation in 
close spatiotemporal proximity reflects a persisting object identity or discrete object 
representations. Masking occurs when the visual system decides in favour of the latter, 
thereby suppressing target visibility. Finally, OSM selectively impairs awareness while 
leaving high-level processing of the target intact, making it an ideal tool for the study of 
unconscious perception. 
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